On False Tribes

On False Tribes

One of man’s most natural impulses is the tribal impulse. Few things come more easily to human beings than dividing other human beings into us and them, in-group and out-group. There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with this behaviour; in fact, it’s essential to the functioning of any society. People naturally cleave to others who are like themselves in any number of different ways, spending time with other members of the same groups as themselves, structuring their identity and self-image around those group memberships, and banding together with other members of the group to advance shared goals and promote shared interests.

Historically, the tribal impulse has typically been directed toward what I will call genuine tribes. A genuine tribe is an identity group capable of self-perpetuation and some level of self-sufficiency. A nation, such as the French, is the example par excellence of a genuine tribe, but subgroups within a nation, such as particular regional communities or ethnic subgroups, or even religious groups, can also qualify as genuine tribes.

For a tribe to be healthy, it needs a certain amount of social cohesion. The members need to identify themselves as members of the tribe and be willing to make sacrifices to advance the interest of the tribe. If the first element is missing, the tribe effectively ceases to exist — if the second is missing, it will not be successful.

One might say that tribes are ‘social constructs’, and this would be largely true, but they tend to be social constructs whose members are bound together by some objectively shared reality. Tribes stake out their territories, for our purposes not so much geographically as in the allegiances of individuals, and this means a lot of competing identity claims.

For example, take a Black American man. There are (at least) two tribes claiming his allegiance: the Black tribe and the American tribe. He has to choose how he is going to reconcile these two competing claims on his loyalty. The extreme position would be simply to choose one, and reject the other. More likely he will attempt to balance his identity as a Black man with his identity as an American, favouring one or the other to various degrees based on any number of factors. The two identities will exist with a certain degree of tension. If the Black and American tribes get along well, in general, this may not be a problem. However, the more friction there is between the two, the more dissonance he will feel, and the more he will be tempted to embrace one tribal identity to the exclusion of the other.

Nevertheless, although among genuine tribes there can certainly be competing claims to the loyalties of particular individuals, and although tribes are certainly in competition in the world for status and resources, nevertheless different (genuine!) tribes are certainly capable in principle of peaceful coexistence as well. Though they can, potentially, present existential threats to each other, there is nothing in their fundamental nature that implies that they must do so.

Moreover, genuine tribes need no excuses to justify their existence, their cohesion as tribal units, or their efforts to advance their own collective interests. No one blames (or at least, no one should blame) a Frenchman for wanting France to be successful and get ahead relative to other countries, nor for working toward that goal by any honourable means available to him.

However, in more modern times, there has been a proliferation of what I will label false tribes. False tribes are groups of people to which individuals direct their tribal impulses, but which lack some or all of the necessary elements to function as a self-sufficient society. Women are the example par excellence of the false tribe, and the defining feature of this social unit is its fundamental incapacity for independent cohesion. This classification also includes such groups as ‘homosexuals’ and ‘workers of the world’.

Notice that I do not say a false tribe is any tribe that does not exist totally self-sufficiently; by that standard any number of ethnic minorities would have to be considered false tribes. Rather, the group in question must be in principle incapable of cohering as an independent social unit.

Because they cannot separate from the wider societies of which they are a part, or even become subsidiary elements of them in the way that local communities are to larger states, the identity claims of false tribes always serve to undermine the healthy functioning of those genuine tribes which allow the memeplexes on which false tribes are built to infect their members.

False tribes are also distinguished from genuine tribes by the need for a narrative of oppression. Because false tribes are not natural social units but only parts of them, it is naturally felt as unjust to advance the interests of such groups over-against the whole. This is easily seen if a man proposes some law or social change and says it should be adopted because it would be ‘good for men’, while admitting that it would harm, for example, women. The normal reaction, even from men, to a proposal, for example, to automatically give the father full custody of the children in all divorce cases, on the grounds that it will make men’s lives better, is disgust (NB I am not here discussing the merits of such a policy, but rather the reaction to the idea of adopting it on the specific grounds here mentioned). It is seen as selfish for a man to promote the interests of men over-against women, in a way that it is not seen as selfish for a Frenchman to promote the interests of France over-against, say, Greece.

To overcome this natural revulsion at the attempt to undermine the cohesive social ties in a functioning genuine tribe by appeal to a pernicious constructed in-group, it is necessary to appeal to a sense of objective justice. Recall that the genuine tribe, as we stated earlier, needs no justification for its collective existence or its recognition or advancement of its own collective interests as a tribe. But the false tribe does. The false tribe constructs a story of the injustices its members have suffered, and insists that ‘all it wants’ is to right those wrongs.

Once the wrongs are righted, in theory, the tribe should be disbanded and its members should return to their natural loyalties. However, the reality is a little different. Tribal loyalties are deeply ingrained. Giving them up is psychically painful, especially when the false tribe in question has been occupying the psychic space that genuine tribes would otherwise have filled and thus has prevented a person from forming the kind of natural tribal ties that should replace the false tribe when it disbands.

It is far easier, instead, to manufacture continually more contrived claims of continuing oppression, to justify the continued operation of the tribe. And indeed this is exactly what we see, for example, with women. Feminism created a false tribe out of the female sex with a claim of oppression on the basis that women lacked certain rights that men had. Whether they ought to have had these rights is debatable, but it is certainly true that men had them and women did not.

Then, something happened that feminists weren’t prepared for: they won. They got everything — all the rights they had been clamouring for. But rather than pack up, go home, and return their loyalties to their families, where they belonged, they then decided they needed even more rights. And when those were gained, they had to have yet more rights. And so it continues into our day of ‘microaggressions’ and ‘consensual rape’ and other such absurdities. Similar phenomena can occur with economic classes; ‘workers of the world’ are definitely a false tribe, as I mentioned earlier. Give them their labour unions, and they will demand higher wages. Give them higher wages, and they will demand more political power. And so on, ad infinitum, as long as they remain a tribe in their own collective mind.

The great issue with false tribes is that they undercut the cohesion of genuine tribes. Natural societies contain both sexes for the fairly obvious reason that without both sexes, a society cannot self-perpetuate. For the same reason, natural societies contain all social classes. Workers and capitalists, peasants and aristocrats are all necessary, in their proper role, for a fully functional, organic society. When the French peasant is made to feel that his class solidarity with the Russian peasant is more important than his local, feudal fealty to his French lord, French society breaks down.

In a well-ordered society, there can be no battle of the sexes, no class warfare. By the same token, however, there will always be some degree of hierarchy in place between different groups. Where the prevailing culture does not foster a sense of noblesse oblige, such that, in the words of Lord Tennyson, the great man [helps] the poor and the poor man loves the great, the ground is fertile for the rise of false tribes.

The solution is for every tribe to see itself as the equivalent of an extended family. Within a family there is hierarchy and diversity. Some command and others obey. Yet all recognise that their collective interest inheres in the family. The parents have no legitimate collective interest against the children, the aunts none against the grandparents. But this can only happen when all the necessary parts of a society are represented in the tribes that occupy the people’s psychic space — and when those with power in the tribe recognise that it is to be used for the good of the whole.

On Moral And Economic Ownership

On Moral And Economic Ownership


Against Private Property

by Arthur Richard Harrison


When it comes to the matter of ownership, there are two very different things the term can mean. It’s peculiar that these two are lumped together under the name of ownership, given that the incentives and behaviours they produce are very different.


Let us call these two concepts economic ownership (as opposed to economic stewardship) and moral ownership (as opposed to moral stewardship).


As you are no doubt aware, the owner is the one to whom a thing belongs, while a steward is one who administers property for the owner. What effects do these have on the behaviour of the person who holds these positions?


Let us consider first the hypothetical homo economicus. This is a man who deals only in economic value — money and the equivalents of money. He’s also purely self-interested. The best way to get such a man to take care of a piece of property, to maintain it in good condition, to avoid destroying its long-term value for the sake of short-term profit, is undoubtedly to give him ownership of it. If he is given ownership of it, he expects that he will have it for life, or at least until he should choose to sell it. In other words, he owns the value of the property itself and will thus, ceteris paribus, seek to maximise the same. He will exploit the property for short-term gain, but his exploitation will be limited by the desire to preserve the value of the property so that he can continue to exploit it in the long run.


By contrast, the economic steward — the man who has a lease or similar arrangement — owns, or at least has access to, the use of the property in the short term, but not the value of it. Thus he seeks to exploit it as much as he can as someone else will ultimately pay the price of his devaluation of the property. This, of course, has been extensively covered by Hoppe and so should be old hat to most of my readers.


However, it shouldn’t take long to observe that real men are seldom homo economicus and that there are all manner of other motivations at play in their behaviour — motivations we might even broadly call ‘incentives’ — beyond economic ones. These incentives might be called ‘cultural’ or ‘honour-based’ but I will use the term ‘moral’ for them in the broadest possible sense, that is, so as to include considerations not only of morality per se, but also of the desire to please God or the gods, to be seen as honourable or noble before other men, to be positively remembered by history, etc.


In this context we can see that there is a certain sense of entitlement that comes with moral ownership. This is the sense of entitlement we see in a child whose idea of ‘mine’ is along the lines of ‘the teddy bear is mine and I can tear it to pieces if I want to’ (hat tip to C S Lewis). This incentive to maximum exploitation, or at least this justification for the removal of restraints on exploitation, is inherent in moral ownership and stands in direct opposition to the economic incentive to limited exploitation. Thus the decision between the two will largely depend on the enlightened self-interest — that is, the time preference — of the individual entrusted with this ownership.


By contrast, moral stewardship affords a rather different incentive. Though, economically, the steward has every reason to despoil the property committed to him, nevertheless morally he will likely not see himself as entitled to do so. The conception of the steward from a moral point of view is that he is merely the caretaker of the property, and as such he has a fiduciary responsibility to the real owner to maintain it in good condition. He would be derelict in that duty if he were to ruin the property for his own benefit.


Of course, none of these incentives are 100% effective. Just as a man can be given economic ownership and thus a strong economic incentive to preserve the value of the property thus committed to him, and nevertheless because of his own high time-preference end up laying it waste, so also a man can have impressed upon him all the profoundest ideas of the duty of a steward and, neither fearing God nor regarding man, despoil the property of others and spend the profits on wine and whores.


No conception of property will ever change the fact that man is fallen, and some men are quite bad and/or stupid and if given the opportunity will do bad things. However, on the basis of the ideas outlined above, it would seem that the best chance we could have to ensure that property were taken care of as well as possible would be to combine, somehow, the notions of economic ownership and of moral stewardship.


This combination will seem alien to the modern mind, raised on the numismolatrous dichotomy of capitalism and communism, where the moral and economic notions of ownership are almost universally coincident. This is why the subtitle of this piece is Against Private Property.


But there’s no reason why it must be so, and indeed in traditional, organic societies, it often was not so. In feudal Europe, in particular, a nobleman’s ‘property’, if you want to call it that, was held, most often, from a higher nobleman, who held it from yet another, and so on up to the king. But even the king was considered to hold his land from God and not truly in his own right. This notion is that to which I was appealing when I wrote, as I have several times on Twitter, that I am uncomfortable with the notion of ‘divine right’ kingship, preferring such framings as ‘divine trust’, ‘divine calling’, even ‘divine duty’.


So the notion that all property is ultimately held from God, and that the holder will answer to God for its use or misuse, is one that allows one to have long-term control (perhaps even including the right to sell, though more below on why that particular aspect of ‘property’ might desirably be limited or excluded) — that is, economic ownership — while minimising the ill effects of moral ownership. And in the feudal system, the many fractal layers of hierarchy reaching down from God, through emperors, kings, and dukes, and eventually down to margraves, viscounts, knights, and the peasants who worked their lands, served to reinforce and emphasise this conception of property, to strengthen its influence on the mind.


Let me suggest, however, that the duty understood as emerging from a nobleman’s role as steward of God is not the only sense in which moral stewardship impressed itself on his mind. There was also a concept of the family, stretching out across generations, in which each generation would hold what it had in trust from its ancestors and for its descendants. Those of my readers who watch the ITV period drama Downton Abbey (and I recommend it highly to all of you) will recognise this way of thinking in the character of Lord Grantham, who reminds his daughter Mary in an early episode that he cannot rightfully destroy the dynasty his ancestors have worked hard to build and of which he is the caretaker for his successors by breaking the entailment of the estate to the Earldom of Grantham. This attitude is, of course, far more likely to obtain if the property is entailed — that is, if the succession descends by operation of law within a particular family and the owner is not entitled to sell it off.


Thus we see that in an organic society it is possible — indeed, it is likely and desirable — that there be no such thing as ‘private property’ in the sense moderns typically understand it. Rather, there is some mixture of economic ownership and moral stewardship, which gives everyone a set role to play in the cosmic drama that is human life. Thus is order established on earth, thus can a sense of noblesse oblige be built. Thus is civilisation made, neither in the Utopian madness of communism nor in the atomising, amoral shark tank of capitalism. Thus are bonds of mutual dependence and affection to be made among the members of a society and across class lines. This attitude is what must be recaptured if we are to build a healthy and functional social order.

Marcionism, Orthodoxy, and the Jewish Question

The question of Christianity’s relation to reaction, white identity, and Judaism has come up enough over the time that I’ve been involved in the reactosphere, and especially lately, that I feel I should articulate my own position on the topic.

My goal on this post is to defend orthodox, traditional Christianity against charges by well-meaning, pro-White Rightists that Christianity is false, harmful, or unsuitable for the white man for any of various reasons pertaining to its relationship to Judaism.

The first charge is the less serious one and the easier to answer; to wit, that Christianity is a deliberate, conscious plot by some past or present group of Jews to destroy the white man.

This charge is ludicrous on its face and I’ll only spend a little bit of time addressing it before I get down to the other, and far more viable, anti-Semitic objection to Christianity.

The simple fact is that historically, the concept of ‘whiteness’ is entirely a product of Christendom. There was no notion of pan-European solidarity against or above or in contrast to non-European peoples before Christianity. Christianity predates any idea of ‘the white man’ for Jews to hate.

The second, and far more salient, objection, is that Christianity, by its doctrinal or cultural nature, undermines white ethnic sentiment and/or elevates Jews above whites and promotes an unhealthy philo-Semitism.

I will take these objections in reverse order. The first, that Christianity promotes an unhealthy philo-Semitism that allows Jews to take advantage of Europeans, is, I think, founded in a provincial view of history. While it is certainly true that Evangelical Protestants do hold a rather self-destructive philo-Semitism, it is also true that this attitude is neither justified by historic Christian doctrine nor (more to the point) is it the norm within Christendom historically.

Examples of the historic attitude of Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and even the less pwned Protestants toward the Jews could be multiplied almost without end, but here are just a few:

We cannot prevent Jews from going to Jerusalem, but we can never sanction it. Jews have not recognized Our Lord, therefore we cannot recognize the Jewish people. They had ample time to acknowledge Christ‘s divinity without pressure, but they didn’t. Should the Jews manage to set foot on the once promised old-new land, the missionaries of the Church would stand prepared to baptize them. Jerusalem cannot be placed in Jewish hands.’ – Pope St Pius X

The characteristics of the Jewish race are parasitic’ – Konstantin Pobedonstsev, advisor to Tsar St Nicholas II and Tsar Alexander III of blessed memory

But see how thereafter the order was changed about: [the Jews] became dogs, and [the Gentiles] became the children.’

‘[T]he synagogue is not only a brothel and a theater; it also is a den of robbers and a lodging for wild beasts.’

If, then, the Jews fail to know the Father, if they crucified the Son, if they thrust off the help of the Spirit, who should not make bold to declare plainly that the synagogue is a dwelling of demons? God is not worshipped there. Heaven forbid! From now on it remains a place of idolatry. But still some people pay it honor as a holy place.’ – St John Chrysostom

‘Therefore be on your guard against the Jews, knowing that wherever they have their synagogues, nothing is found but a den of devils in which sheer self­glory, conceit, lies, blasphemy, and defaming of God and men are practiced most maliciously and veheming his eyes on them.’ – Martin Luther

And I think the Jews would be as surprised as we are to learn that Christianity is merely a tool for their benefit. Jews, in fact, have long maintained that we are their great persecutors. ‘The Jews are a nervous people. Nineteen centuries of Christian love have taken their toll,’ remarked Benjamin Disraeli once.

Christian philo-Semitism is actually quite a recent phenomenon. If Christianity, by design, exalts the Jew at the expense of the Gentile and compels the Christian to defer to the Jew, to love the Jew, and to act in the interests of the Jew — well, let’s just say it took Christians a damned long time to figure out that aspect of their religion.

It is tempting, perhaps, to adopt Marcionism, a heresy that teaches that the God of the Old Testament is not the God of the New Testament, or some variation thereupon, in an effort to reconcile a hostility toward Jews with an adherence to Christ. At this point it is typical to emphasise the ‘Greek’ or ‘Germanic’ or otherwise ‘European’ aspects of Christianity.

This does not solve the problem. The New Testament does not leave any room to deny the Old. To believe in a Christ who is not affiliated with the God of the Old Testament is to make up one’s own Christ, one who bears at best a vague resemblance to the Christ described in the canonical Gospels.

Now, I have often said that Christianity is the religion of paradox, and that attempts to resolve the paradoxes within Christianity (such as the dual nature of Christ or the triune nature of the Godhead) by simply throwing out one or the other side of the dilemma are properly termed ‘heresy’.

But here I am not even sure that we have a legitimate paradox. Certainly, the majority of Evangelicals, and even a great many Catholics and Orthodox, have been infected by a virulent philo-Semitism. They put the Jews on a pedestal. They say ridiculous things like that the Jews are our ‘older brothers’ (indeed — they are our older brothers in precisely the same meaningless sense that Ishmael is the older brother to our forefather Isaac), they participate in Jewish feasts, light menorahs, et cetera. And their attitude toward Jewry — and toward race in general — is certainly incompatible with white ethnonationalism.

But what is the real disease here? Is Christianity the problem? Is secular culture less Jew-friendly and more white-friendly?

In fairness, it may be marginally less Jew-friendly; the left tends not to be as rabidly pro-Israel as the Religious Right, though no less worshipful of domestic Jews. But it is certainly not more pro-white ethnocentrism.

The Christian Church is not a magical institution that protects its members from all influence by the Zeitgeist. When we are asking ‘what political and social views does Christianity promote?’ we cannot simply ask ‘what political and social views do Christians hold right now?’ without asking whether those views are unique to Christians or clearly derived from distinctly Christian sources.

Are modern traditional Christians philo-Semites? Yes, of course. They caught the bug from heretics — everyone did. But there’s nothing inherently philo-Semitic about traditional Christianity per se — indeed, just the opposite.

Likewise the claim that Christianity’s ‘universalist’ leanings render it incompatible with white thedishness. This simply is not true. In fact, the Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church declares:

Christian patriotism may be expressed at the same time with regard to a nation as an ethnic community and as a community of its citizens. The Orthodox Christian is called to love his fatherland, which has a territorial dimension, and his brothers by blood who live everywhere in the world. This love is one of the ways of fulfilling God’s commandment of love to one’s neighbour which includes love to one’s family, fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens.

What must be understood is that life has both a universal and a particular aspect. Christianity itself cannot be limited to being solely an expression of white thedishness — or any other people’s thedishness for that matter. But it does not preclude that thedishness — indeed it encourages it. Christianity, at the highest level of abstraction, is concerned with universal truth and with the salvation of all men. But these are not the only concerns of individual, particular, actual Christians. Orthodox Christianity recognises the right of all peoples to thedishness — and that includes whites. It is not clear to me what more than this white nationalists want, unless it is a religion that is entirely a means to their political aims.

Perhaps the claimed problem is that it is destructive to white interests to hold up the Jews as ‘God’s chosen people’. But that demands the question: ‘chosen for what?’ The answer is that the Jews were chosen to bring forth the God-Man, Jesus Christ, which purpose they have fulfilled. After bringing Him forth, they rejected Him, mocked Him, and crucified Him. At that point they forfeited whatever spiritual seniority they might otherwise have had over us Gentiles. The current Jewish religion is the only one in the world (with Islam’s debatable exception) whose kernel is the rejection of Christ — other religions reject Him by implication, but only the Jews make the explicit rejection of Him the definition of their religion.

When a white man rejects Christianity because he hates Jewry, the Jews are pleased. Jews dont hate Europeans because they have light skin, or come from Europe, or are the ‘bestest race in the whole wide world’, or something. They hate us because they hate Christ — and we, more than any other race, have embraced Him and spread His Gospel to the ends of the Earth. When we cease to do that, Jews win. They do not win (at least not quite as much) if we embrace Marcionism, but Marcionism is incoherent, and it answers a non-problem. There simply is no contradiction between the enduring, historic doctrines and principles of traditional Christianity and either anti-Semitism or white thedishness.

The Queen is Dead! Long Live The King!

People of Bavaria,

It is my sad duty to inform you that Her Majesty, Queen Arthuria, went to her eternal reward today at the age of 76. A chronicle of her life is being prepared.

Long live King Gregor!

Nicholas Escalona, you will be next, playing the Queen’s grandson, King Gregor. Your save file is here.

The Life of Queen Arthuria von Sigmaringen of Bavaria, Part I

Recently a few of my reactionary Twitter friends and I started a CK2 succession game. @ReactoKikaijin played first, as Duke Samuel of Bavaria, but died early and handed the game off to his daughter, Arthuria, as whom I took over. What follows is an AAR the first part of my reign; I haven’t finished yet but already I’ve made a name for the family.


Duchess Arthuria of Bavaria was catapulted into public life at the tender age of 12 when her father, Duke Samuel, died an untimely death. The first few years of her reign were years of uncertainty as she wondered whom in her court she could trust, all the while knowing that until she came of age, her actual influence was limited as she lived under a regency. During this time the government Duchy moved cautiously. Duke Samuel’s High Council was shaken up a bit, notably by the replacement of his spymaster with Prince-Bishop Heinrich of Trent, but other than that little of note happened during the regency.


On 3 March, 1087, Duchess Arthuria came of age and began to rule in her own right.


Shortly afterward she was married to her cousin, Prince Joakim of Denmark, as her father had arranged for her prior to his death.


At some point early in her reign, Duchess Arthuria developed a burning desire, which she would later describe as a ‘divine mission’, to restore the ancient Kingdom of Bavaria. The coming years of her reign would be devoted almost single-mindedly to the dual goal of restoring this kingdom and securing the succession.


To that end, anything that weakened the other lords of the Empire who might be interested in taking the Kingdom, especially the powerful Duke of Carinthia, met with Arthuria’s wholehearted support.


In 1089, Arthuria raised taxes on the Church within her realm. Despite her reputation for devout religiosity, the Duchess was not at all unaware of the vast wealth of the Church, and her coffers were nearly empty at the beginning of her reign. This would prove a wise decision as mercenaries were later responsible in large part for Bavarian military success.


On 2 Feb, 1090, Arthuria gave birth to her first son and heir apparent, Nicholas. She then fell gravely ill for a period of two weeks, during which many in the court feared for her survival. But the Duchess was strongly constituted and bounced back, more determined than ever:



In August of 1090, Arthuria declared a war to seize the County of Osterreich, claiming her right to rule it on the basis of documents that many historians now agree were of dubious validity. She also found herself pregnant with her second child.



In the battles of Osterriech and Salzburg, the Bavarian army wiped out the Austrian one, and the war was effectively over by the time Arthuria’s second son, Viktor, was born.



On 20 Dec, 1091, the official peace was signed and Duchess Arthuria became the Countess of Osterreich, one step closer to restoring the Kingdom of Bavaria.



In March of 1092, Duchess Arthuria arranged a betrothal between her son Nicholas and Countess Hedwig of Karnten, a legal vassal of the Kingdom of Bavaria, in hopes that this would help cement her family’s claim to the throne.


Shortly afterward, she found herself pregnant again, and on 2 December, 1092, gave birth to her third son, Norbert.



During this time, although it had little direct relevance to Bavaria, it is worthy of note from a world perspective that the King of England successfully seized Jersualem back from the Moslems.




In January of 1095, Arthuria’s youngest son Norbert died of pneumonia, which came to be called the Sigmaringen family curse, in remembrance of the fear it had occasioned after Nicholas’s birth.

The death of her son deeply grieved the Duchess, and she withdrew more and more from social life, focusing more and more single-mindedly on her political aspirations.


In May of 1095, to avoid dividing the Duchy between her sons, Duchess Arthuria decreed that succession would henceforth be elective, and immediately nominated Nicholas as her chosen heir. This change came at a cost, however; for the rest of the Duchy’s brief remaining time as an independent realm, her son’s inheritance was always precarious and the vassals had to be kept happy, as Arthuria needed their support to keep her family on the throne after her death.


To that end, Arthuria worked hard to keep Nicholas popular, and much of the increased church taxation was spent on bribes to the counts.


In September of 1097, Duchess Arthuria received a call to war from the Duke of Verona, a distant relative by marriage, but refused. He was attempting to seize the Duchy of Carinthia, but the union of Verona and Carinthia, as Arthuria knew, would make it far harder for her to incorporate Carinthia into its lawful kingdom of Bavaria once she took that title. Despite Arthuria’s inaction, however, and much to her consternation, Duke Berthold did ultimately take Carinthia as his own.


In January of 1098, the Duchess fell pregnant again. It was Prince Joakim’s hope that the birth of this child would help return Arthuria to some kind of normalcy after the loss of Norbert, and indeed, the birth of her fourth son Mathias on 17 August 1098 did seem to bring her out of her depression somewhat.ck2_61


However, the Duchess had other problems. A critical mass of electors were now favouring her vassal, Count Berthold of Innsbruck, as heir to her throne over her son. Although Berthold was old and Arthuria expected to survive him, in the world of medieval nobility no one was promised tomorrow. After attempts to bribe and cajole the majority back onto her side seemed to fail, Arthuria arranged a ‘hunting accident’ in which Berthold was to be killed.

However, the assassins failed. Arthuria’s involvement was not discovered, and shortly afterward Prince-Bishop Siegfried declared that he now supported Nicholas as heir, restoring his majority among the electors. Arthuria called off her plot against Berthold and no one was the wiser.

However, the college of Electors was still favouring Nicholas by only five votes to four. When Arthuria discovered that one of her enemies among the Electors, Count Norbert of Passau, was involved in an illegal plot, she lost no time in using that excuse to imprison him. Perhaps she hoped he would die sooner in her dungeons and his heir would be more favourable. Perhaps she hoped he would rebel and give her an excuse to revoke his electoral title, though this did not happen. In any case, Norbert would spend the next few years a prisoner of Duchess Arthuria, in the depths of the Oubliette.



During this time, Arthuria also hatched a plot to have her sister’s husband Hartwig killed, as she noted that their daughter, if allowed to succeed, would take her mother’s title out of Arthuria’s suzerainty. After Count Hartwig’s ‘tragic and untimely demise’, Duchess Arthuria arranged a ‘much more suitable’ match in hopes that a son born from it would displace his half-sister and keep his aunt’s realm intact.



In October of 1102, with the support of numerous local nobles, Arthuria produced trumped-up documents that claimed she was rightfully the Duchess of Austria as well as Bavaria


The war to press this claim was swift and virtually uncontested. The Austrian army was crushed, the garrisons quickly surrendered, and by March of 1104, Arthuria had declared herself Duchess of Austria.


However, the former Duke of Austria was now a count in Arthuria’s realm, and unsurprisingly supported himself as heir to it. Fortunately, no one else took him seriously and he was not a threat to either of the established major candidates.

On 21 Jan, 1105, Duchess Arthuria declared that the ancient Kingdom of Bavaria was now restored under her, and by implication, that she was the rightful liege to the remaining still-independent lords of old Bavaria.

Here ends the first part of her chronicle. In Part II we will recount how the Queen used her newfound status and power within the Empire.

The Problem of Abdication: A Tangential Reply to @AnomalyUK

In recent times, it has become a trend for monarchs to abdicate when they feel they are too old or sick to effectively carry out their duties. Pope Benedict XVI abdicated over a year ago, leading to the election of Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio as Pope Francis (of whom my opinions are well known). Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands abdicated a little more than a year ago in favour of her son, now King Willem-Alexander.

Anomaly UK has written relatively positively (in passing) of the practice of abdication by elderly monarchs. I, however, am concerned by the trend.

Historically, monarchies have always claimed divine origin as a source of their legitimacy, and many of the monarchies of Europe continue, in name at least, to do so. Elizabeth the Second is officially Queen of the United Kingdom ‘by the grace of God’, for example.

Pagan monarchies often claimed their monarchs were gods, or were descended from gods. This has the advantage of lending a divine aura to the entire royal family, so abdication there may not be much of a problem; one simply replaces one god with another. (This system has great disadvantages as well; I’ve touched on these on Twitter once or twice and I may write about them here eventually).

Christian monarchies, however, were barred from this strategy by theological considerations, so instead they claimed that monarchs were chosen by God. This makes a certain amount of sense; after all, no man can control what kind of person is born into a particular family, so it is only natural that such decisions would be attributed to God.

However, the implications for abdication in this case are severe. If the king is chosen by God to rule, then who is anyone — even and perhaps especially the king himself — to set that calling aside and choose someone different for the role?

Of course, there are times when any sane standard of practicality demands that someone else rule in the king’s stead, either by means of regency or abdication. And if a king is genuinely incapable of doing his job — for example, if he is so senile as to be unaware of his surroundings — then one could plausibly make the claim that the time has come to relinquish his divine calling in favour of a more capable successor.

However, when abdication is carried out for the sake of convenience, it seriously undermines the divine justification for the monarchical institution.

Of course, theologically, we cannot say that God’s hands are somehow tied. One can say, as a matter of theory, that in the moment the elder monarch abdicates, the successor receives the divine mandate. However, this doesn’t change the fact that God Himself is supposed to have chosen the previous monarch. And while He has also chosen the successor, abdication for frivolous causes nevertheless tends to convey the impression that the monarch is not taking his divine vocation seriously. And if he does not take it seriously, why should anyone else?

The key point here is not that a monarch must always serve till death (though in my opinion that should be the norm), but rather that he must place his calling as monarch ahead of his personal satisfaction or other trivial concerns. If he does not, he betrays a lack of respect for his own office, and that lack will be contagious.

Abdication cannot be forbidden, per se, but it should be stigmatisedWhen the late Emperor Otto of Austria was asked (many years ago) whom he despised most as a contemporary figure, he answered, ‘the Duke of Windsor who has abdicated.’

The Emperor had the right idea. Christian monarchy cannot survive if kings abandon their posts for light or trivial reasons, and especially not if they are praised for it. If ‘divine right’ is to survive in any useful, meaningful way, it must transcend itself and become the principle of the monarch’s ‘divine duty’, before God, to his realm and his people. Otherwise it amounts to a rather self-aggrandising idea on the monarch’s part.

In other words, ‘abdication-shaming’, if you will, is necessary to the institution of Christian monarchy, and recent reactionary embrace of abdication is, in my opinion, a short-sighted strategic blunder.

Woman’s Primordial Fear

It is frequently observed by Manospherians and traditionalists alike that women have a tendency that borders on the pathological to invade previously male-only spaces, with little to no regard for the effect that has on the dynamic of the existing group; even if the original group’s purpose is entirely thwarted by the presence of women, and even if women have no interest in the thing that prompted the formation of the group in the first place, they nevertheless insist on being admitted to it, or on destroying it.

Now, it is certainly the case, as is usual with feminist nonsense, that men, collectively speaking, deserve some of the blame for rolling over and letting them get away with it. I say that just to get it out of the way, because for the purposes of this post I am not interested in that fact. I am going to attempt to explain why women behave the way they do; the fact that men should have stopped them is beside the point and comments to that effect will be deleted.

Why, then, is it so important to women to be included in everything? Why will they break off a long-held friendship because another woman forgot to invite them to a party? Why must they insist on joining men-only golf clubs and shutting down the old-fashioned gentlemen’s clubs?  I imagine these questions baffle a lot of men. They certainly baffled me, until recently. I could see what women were doing and recognise the ill effects of their behaviour pattern, but I didn’t understand the motivation.

Now, however, I think I do. You see, social exclusion is woman’s primordial fear.  More than anything else, a woman fears being cast out of the tribe.

In the ancestral environment, women were entirely dependent creatures. (Honestly, I think they basically still are, but it’s not as obvious anymore; rising technology makes a lot of social dynamics hard to understand, as neoreaction has previously observed with regard to crime rates.) They depended on men for protection against hostile tribes, wild animals, adverse weather, and other physical dangers, as well as for the provision of basic material needs. A man, of course, benefited greatly by being part of a social group; but if you cast him out, he could probably survive at least long enough to find a new tribe to join. For a woman, on the other hand, to be sent out on her own would be a death sentence.

As such, women are naturally adapted to the task of securing male protection and provision. They do this through the maintenance of social bonds, both to particular men (husbands, fathers, and sons, for the most part), and to the tribe as a whole. Accordingly, women developed a mode of discourse adapted to the realm of interpersonal relations in which they dwelt, and, moreover, they developed desires and fears that would push them toward the achievement of this evolutionary goal. It’s the fears that I’d like to focus on in this piece.

It is only logical that if the maintenance of social bonds is the means by which a woman secures her living, then the breaking of those social bonds is what she would fear most. The idea that people close to her have a social space that she is utterly excluded from causes her great psychic distress. She is not concerned with the fact that her presence would interfere with the group’s ability to perform its purpose, nor with the fact that she has no interest in the activities the group engages in. All she is concerned with, fundamentally, is the fact that a deep biological fear has been triggered, viz. the fear of being cast out on her own.

This same reality also explains women’s obsessive desire for attention, in all its manifestations: the attention whore, the attention-seeking false self-deprecation, the constant need for male validation, etc. If what women need most of all is the protection and provision of a man (usually their father early in life, their husband in mid-life, and a son by the end of their life), then for them to be neglected or forgotten by the men close to them is the small-scale equivalent of being cast out of the tribe, and just as terrifying, if not more so.

This explains a key difference between men’s behaviour and women’s behaviour:

To a man, abuse is worse than neglect.

To a woman, neglect is worse than abuse.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that men want to be neglected, or women want to be abused, exactly. But it does mean that if a woman has the choice between being abused and being ignored entirely, she will often choose to be abused. At least an abusive man is paying attention to her. In the ancestral environment, even a man who would beat his woman for petty reasons probably wouldn’t let her starve or be eaten by wild animals. Suboptimal? Sure. But was it better for her to strike out on her own? Not at all.

Of course, a woman who has options is less likely to stay with an abuser. What kind of options did a woman have in the ancestral environment? Realistically, the only thing that was likely to be on the table for a woman severely mistreated by her husband was a return to her father’s custody.

The absence of her father, therefore, would have two negative effects on a woman:

1. She would grow up starved for male attention, protection, and validation, and would learn to seek it wherever she could find it. She would soon learn that the easiest way to get male attention is to give away sex. It should come as a shock to no one that this theory predicts women with absent fathers will be sluts. (I’d cite a source to prove this is the case, but come on.)

2. She would be more likely to tolerate abuse, partially because of the attention starvation mentioned in (1) and partially because she wouldn’t have a father to fall back on if she left her husband.

And again, I dont really think I need to have a whole lot of scientific study done to confirm that women with absent fathers tend to be: a) more promiscuous and b) more tolerant of abuse than others.

This hypothesis explains a great deal of female behaviour that might otherwise baffle men. As a final example, let’s take men’s and women’s differing responses to shame.

It is well known that women respond to herd-shaming; they want the broader society to think well of them, and as such if the mass of women (or men) disapprove of their behaviour they will change it. (They will also tend to change their behaviour if one or a few men they really respect and consider to care for them disapprove, but men also have this response and therefore it’s not quite as interesting.) Men, on the other hand, are relatively indifferent to the opinions of people they dont respect. Mass cadshaming by women does not work. Mass slutshaming by women does work. It works because woman is a herd animal who fears being cast out of the tribe, and man is not.

When you understand this crucial point, women’s behaviour, and their misbehaviour, starts making a whole lot more sense.